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IN THB 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintif !-Respondent. Case No. 
vs. 
JOHN CHARLES WILKS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
12091 
John Charles Wilks appeals from a jury convidtion of 
assault with intent to commit murder in the Fourth Judi-
cial District Court, in and for Utah County, the Honorable 
Maurice Harding, pres!iding. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The jury found defendant guilty of assault with intent 
to commit murder. He was sentenced to the Utah State 
Prison for an indeterminate term of not lass ;tJhan f:ive years 
nor more than life. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the judgment of the 
Four!th Judicial Disttrict Court should be affiilmed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The recital of the fiacls in Appellant's brief is substan-
tially correci. Respondent's correcrtJions and additions are 
made hereinafter. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN PERMITTING DR. POWELL 
TO POINT OUT THE BULLET SCARS ON 
OFFICER WARREN'S HEAD. 
After Trooper Charles Warren was brought into the 
couritrioom s1tting in a wheelchair, the district attorney 
interrogated Dr. PoweH (T. 44). 
"QUESTION: Doctor, I have in the courtroom 
Trooper Warren. Could yiou explwin to the jury and 
show them on his skull where rthe points of entry 
were? 
"ANSWER : There is a large scar here, a 
curved scar, which is the surgica:l incision. This 
irregularirty is where the bone was remov;ed. And 
the two wounds are here in the right s1ide of the 
forehead at this point here (indicating). They have 
become qu'ite pale, and you can barely see them. 
You can isee rthem Clearly enough here and here (in-
dicaJting) . " 
The riespondent submits thaJt Utah's weH developed 
case 1am on admissibility of ".gruesome" phdbographic evi-
dence is disposiltive of appellant's conte:rubion that Officer 
Warren's appearance prejudiced the jury. 
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The proper test of admissibility of such evidence and 
reviiew thereof is stated in State v. Renzo, 21 Utah 2d 205, 
215, 443 P. 2d 392, 399 ( 1968). 
"The fact that a picture may be grue3ome is no 
reason for excluding it from evidence if it is other-
wise competent and relevant. It is a matter of dis-
cretion with the trial judge to determine whether 
the probaJtive value of the picture outweighs the 
possible adverse effect which might be produced 
upon being shown to a jury. 23 C. J. S. Crnmina:l 
Law § 852 (1) c. This discretion on the part of a 
trial judge to admit or reject evidence should not 
be interfered with by an appellate court unless 
manifest error is &hown." 
Acc01'd: People v. Schiers, 160 Cal. App. 2d 364, 324 
P. 2d 981 ( 1968); People v. Bennett, 208 Cal App. 2d 317, 
25 Cal. Rptr. 257 ( 1962); People v. Cheary, 48 Cal. 2d 301, 
309 P. 2d 431 ( 1957); Martinez v. People, 124 Colo. 170, 
235 P. 2d 810 ( 1951). 
The state had the burden of proving appellant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt of assault with intent to commit 
murder. Appellanrt's entry of ia not guilty plea puts in issue 
every material allegation of the information. Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-24-4 (1953). The Code defines the "malice" 
which must be shown by the staJte to prove intenJt to com-
mit murder aJt 76-30-2, ito-wirt: 
"Such m31lice may be express or limplied. lt is 
express when there is manifested a deliberate in-
tention unlawfully to take the Hf e of a fell ow crea-
ture. It is implied when no considerable provoca-
tion appears, or when the circumstances attending 
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the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart." 
( Emphwr;is added.) 
The buUet holes in Offiicer Warren's skull were thus 
probative of ithe issues, even though defendant did not con-
trovert the ex~s.tence of the scaris. The Utah Supreme Court 
passed on this issue in State v. Russell, 106 Utah 116, 133, 
145 P. 2d 1003, 1010 ( 1944) : 
"The pictures of the deceased, ,'taken afrter her 
deaith and showing her wounds, were clearly ad-
mi:ssible. Even :thougih the defendant did admit the 
killing, he did not admit the 1intent to kill and the 
naJture of the wounds may be material on that point. 
The pictures showed the nature of :the wounds more 
clearly than the tesitimony of witnesses could." 
Accord: People v. Bennett, 208 Cal. App. 2d 317, 25 
Cal. Rptr. 257, (1962); McKee v. State, 31 So. 2d 656 (Ala. 
1947); State v. Woods, 62 Utah 397, 220 P. 2115 (1923). 
The fact thaJt the evidence may be cumulaltive does 
not prevent its admission. 
"There iwas oral testimony to the effect thaJt 
the defendant 1sholt four bullets into the face and 
neck of the victim, missed with ltwo shots, and then 
snapped the pisfol at the victim's head two more 
times. The def endanlt, therefore, reasons thaJt there 
was no need for piicltures 'alt aJlil, as the c:riime was 
8Jmply proved. The f a!llacy of this reasoning is his 
fiaflure to see thaJt the oral testimony may be dis-
counlted by iftre jury; 1and while the picture may nolt 
enaJble the jury to oount the bullet holes tin the vic-
tim's face, the v1arfous s·ources of blood ;indicate a 
number of bleeding sources, all of which ris proper 
as showing the viciousness of the assault and the 
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depravity of the defendant in making it." State v. 
Jackson, 22 Utah 2d 408, 409, 454 P. 2d 290, 291 
(1969). 
In State v. Renzo, supra, this court painted to the 
corroborative value of demonstrative evidence. 
"The extent and nature of the wound and ,the 
atrooity of the crime also were material questions. 
Clearly the photographs, though cumulative, served 
to corroborate the dootor's toofimony and were ad-
missible for that purpose." 
Accord: State v. Martinez, 92 Idaho 183, 439 P. 2d 
691 (1968); State v. Aubuchon, 394 S. W. 2d 327 (Mo. 
1965); People v. Toth, 182 Cal. App. 2d 819, 6 Oal. Rptr. 
372 (1960). 
The evidence of two identical holes % inch apart in 
Officer Warren".s head is especially probative in light of 
appellant's contention that his gun discharged acciidentaJlly. 
(Appellant's briief at 25). Not only is the evidenoe perti-
nent to the issue of whether the shooting was accidental 
or intentional, ,it is also per1Jinent to the question of degree 
of the crime, i.e., whether there was specific intent Ito mur-
der or only a gene:r:al intent .to do bodily harm. The jury 
was insitruc:ted on assault with irutent to do bodily harm 
as a lei.sser included offense of assault with intent to commit 
murder. See: generally 23 C. J. S. Criminal Law § 852 
(l)c, (1967); 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence §§ 785-89 (1966); 
159 A. L. R. 1413 (1945); 73 A. L. R. 2d 769 (1960). 
The state should be permiit:ted to prove its case by the 
strongoot evidence possible. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
" [A] colorless admission by the opponent may 
sometimes have the effect of depriving a party of 
the legitimaJte moral force of his evidence; further-
more a judicial admisisiion may be cleverly made 
with grudging limitaJtions or evasions or insinua-
tions ( especia:lly in criminal cases) , so as to be 
technically but not practically a waiver of proof." 
9 Wigmore on Evlidence § 259'1 (3d Ed. 1948). 
Accord: State v. Upton, 60 N. M. 205, 290 P. 2d 440 
(1955); Hawkins v. State, 219 Ind. 116, 37 N. E. 2d 79 
(1941); State V. Nelson, 1'62 Ore. 430, 92 P. 2d 182 (1939). 
"[T]he prosecution, wiith its burden of estab-
lishing guHt !beyond a reasonable doubt iis not to be 
denied the right to prove every essenitia!l element of 
the crime by the most convincing evidence it is able 
to produce. No one would he heard to object to 
te.:rtlimony which does no more ,than :faithfully de-
scribe the wounds which were inflicted upon the 
victim of a homicide, no matter how horrifyling the 
mrrati.on might be. But a photograph of the corpse 
may fomfy the oral 1testimony. Should it be ex-
Cluded because ,iJt is, perhaps, even more revoltJing? 
We think not, as long as !the def.endant stands upon 
his plea of not guilty." State v. Jensen, 209 Ore. 
239, 280, 296 P. 2d 618, 638 (19156). 
Appellant's reliance on State v. Poe, 21 Uta:h 2d 113, 
441 P. 2d 512 (1968) is misplaced. The Poe cdlor slides 
held iruidmi&Slihle by the Cour:t depicted the "gory proced-
ures of the pathologist," not marks left on the decedent by 
the criminal. This court held properly admissiible itlwo 
photographs of the victim as he apP'eared at the culmina-
'1Jion of the crime. In the instant case it was far better for 
appellant that Officer Warren was permiitted to app,ear at 
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the time of trial with his externa:l wounds almost healed 
(T. 44) than if the prosecution had introduced pictures 
taken at the scene of the '.Shooting. 
Further, the Kentucky Supreme Court 1in Napier v. 
Commonwealth, 426 S. W. 2d 121 (Ky. 1968) suggested 
that courits should be skeptical of claims that a jury can be 
changed from a body of rational men into a passionate mob 
by the introduotion of demonstraJtJive evidence. Where the 
issue was whether a post mortem photograph of the vic-
tim's face showring a bullet hole was 1adm'issii1Yle, the court 
reasoned as follows : 
"The fact is thaJt iit was not so gruesome as to 
be likely to prejudice or inflame the men and women, 
inured as they are to the horrors of both war and 
television, who sit on a modern jury. The time has 
come when it should be presumed that a person cap-
able of serving as a juror in a murder case can, wruth-
out losing his head, bear rthe 1sight of a photograph 
showing the body of the decedent in the condition 
or place in which found." 
Finally, respondent submits thaJt even tif 1it were error 
to permit Officer Warren to appear, in light of rthe over-
whelming evidence supporting convidtion of assault wiith 
intenit to commit murder and sentence for an indefiniite 
term in prison of from five years Ibo l'ife, such error could 
not be considered prejud~cial with!in the meaning of Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-42-1 (1953). 
"After hearing an appeal 1the court must give 
judgment withowt regard to errors on defects whfoh 
do not aff ecit the subsitantial rights of 1the parties. 
If error has been commiltted, it shall not be pre-
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sumed to have resu'lted in prejudice. The Court 
mum lbe saJtisfied that it has thaJt effect before it 
is warranted in revers1ing the judgment." 
POINT II. 
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION IS WELL SUP-
PORTED BY ·THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED 
AT TRIAL. 
Ample eVJidence was adduced on each element of the 
cvime charged to convince the jury of appe'1Iant's guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Officer Duke of the Springville 
Police was 15 feet away from the appel'lant at '·the 1time 
Officer Warren was shot. He testified that he dretw and 
:filr·ed his gun at appellant only after he saw appellant turn 
toward Warren and f:ire rtwo shots, huding Officer Warren 
to ithe ground ( T. 13) . The appeJilant then turned and fired 
art; Officer Duke, and these shoits sounded rthe same to Duke 
as rthooe which had felled Off,icer W1arren (T. 22, 25). Offi-
cer Rasmussen of the Highway Patrol testified that after 
the shooting he saw appeUant running d.nto a nearby field 
wiifu a revolver in his hand (T. 30). Only appellant's testi-
mony controve:rits these facts. The jury could well discount 
appeHanlt's "ricochet" theory (Appellant's b1iief at 16) on 
the basi·s of this evMence. The "iacoidental dd.>Scharge" 
theory (Appelilant's brief at 25) deserved little credence 
in light of the 100aJtion of the bullet hio1les in Warren's head. 
Appellant's claim that it is physiica1'ly impossible for ihis 
singJe ... shot six-shooter .tJo have fired shots one or two sec-
onds apart (Appel'lant's brief alt 16) is contradicted by 
oommon experience. 
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POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRE-
TION IN PERNllTTING DR. POWELL TO TES-
TIFY AS TO THE CALIBER OF BULLETS IN 
OFFICER WARREN'S HEAD. 
The district attorney laid the fallowing foundation for 
his question of Dr. Powell regarding the bullet size (T. 38) : 
"QUESTION: Doctor, 1were you able fo tell 
the size of the holes that you mentioned of entry? 
"ANSWER: Yes. The two holes were approxi-
mately a quarter of an inch in diameter. About 
three quarters of an inch apart. And they looked 
to me like they might have been made by a .32 -
size bullet. And I put ithat down on my emergency 
room report, that they suggested a .32 caliber bullet. 
And then I put a question mark, because I wasn't 
entirely sure. 
"QUESTION: Are you familiar with the dif-
ferent sizes of bullets, .32, .22, .38, .357 et cetera? 
"ANSWER: Yes. 
"QUESTION: Do you have an op1mon as to 
whether or not :this size of hole - strike that. Have 
you in your work, had occasion rto examine other 
gunshot wounds? 
"ANSWER: Many. 
"QUESTION: And based on your training and 
experience, do you have an opinion as to whether 
or not this hole could have been caused by a shell 
l1arger than a .32? 
"ANSWER: Yes. 
"QUESTION: And what i 1s your opinion? 
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"ANSWER: N:o, i1t could not have been. It 
could have been a .32 caHber bullet hol,e, but it was 
too small to be '1arger than a .32 caliber. 
"QUESTION: Could it have been a .357 mag-
num? 
"ANSWER: No. 
"QUESTION: Could it have been a .22? 
"ANSWER: Yes, ,it might." 
lit is well settled in U1Jah that a triaJl judge has wide 
diiscretnon in determiniing whether proper foundaJtion has 
been laid for opinion evidence. In Road Commisswn v. 
Silliman, 22 U1Jah 2d 33, 34, 448 P. 2d 347, 348 (1968), this 
Court held 'as follows : 
''The qualiffoaJtion of an expert witness is 'to 
he determined by rthe trial judge, and if he deter-
mines that a witness by reason of trari.ning and ex-
perience can assiist ithe jury by giviing an opinion 
on a ma1Jtier prop'erly before the court, we on appeal 
should not hold that itestimony should be stricken 
unless such palp3Jble ignorance of the sulbjecit maJt-
iter is manJifeSlted by the wiitness n;s :to indicate an 
.abuse of discretJion on the part of <the lt:riia!l judge 
in alloWing fue witness to express an opinion in 
the f.irSlt place or rin ref using to grant a moltion Ito 
strike aflter iJt has been given." 
Accord: Marsh v. Irvine, 22 Utah 2d 1154, 449 P. 2d 
996 (1969); Stagmeyer v. Leatham Bros., Inc., 20 Ulbah 2d 
421, 439 P. 2d 279 (1969). 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
ERROR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE 
JURY. 
The Court refused to give defendant's requested in-
structions Nos. 2, 10, 11 and 13, giving instead instructions 
which adequaitely covered these fields. 
Defendant's requested instruction No. 2 defines "un-
lawful and unlawfully", "deliberate", "premeditate", "in-
tent", and "specific intent". The instructions given by the 
court substantially cover these matters. No. 6 sets forth 
the elemenrts of the crime, No. 7 deals with "malice afore-
thought", No. 10 defines abandoned and malignant heart; 
No. 12 covers "specific intent". 
Defendant's requested instruction No. 10 defining as-
sault with intent to commit murder is as well covered in 
the court's instructions Nos. 6 and 7. 
Instructions Nos. 11 and 13 requested by the defendant 
dealing with "accidental discharge" was substantial'ly given 
in the court's 1instrucition No. 16. 
The matter of "specific intent" is thoroughly dealt 
with in the court's instructions Nos. 8 and 10. 
Since the matters raised by appellant were substan-
tially covered by the court's instructions, no reversible 
error appears. People v. Anderson, 64 Cal. 2d 633, 414 P. 
2d 366 (1966) ;Clews v. People, 151 Colo. 219, 377 P. 2d 
125 ( 1962); Carlson v. State, 445 P. 2d 157 (Nev. 1968). 
Appellant's dispute with the court's instruction No. 6 
defining assault with intent to commit murder is based 
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upon his incorrect quatartion of that instruction. The full 
sentence reads as follows : 
"(b) an ass,au1t with intenrt to commit murder 
is an unlawful attempt, coupled with a presenrt abil-
irty, to murder a human being." 
The inclusion of the final phrase makes it clear that 
an attempt to murder muslt be made, and the courrt fully 
instru0ted the jury as to the intent necessary for a murder. 
Further, the element of intent is 1specifically defined 
by \the court in instruction No. 8. There can be l!iittle doubt 
thaJt the jury was fully advised that intent itJo murder is a 
requisite element of ibhe crime. 
Appellant finds instruction No. 7 objectionable be-
cause it refers Ito "kining". An insitruction on assault with 
intent to commit murder must define "murder". It 1is diffi-
cult to imagine how 1:he court cou'ld define "murder" with-
out reference to kiiUing, since murder is a type of kiHing. 
Appellant contends that giving instructions Nos. 12 
and 17 overemphasized the significance of circumstantial 
evidence. No. 17 deals with the value of circumstantial 
evidence in general, while No. 12 is a more detailed expla-
natton regarding ithe finding by the jury of intent to kill 
from the circumsltances. Appellant seems to argue both 
ways : ( 1) that the jury was 1inadequately instructed on 
intent, and (2) that itoo much was said about intent and 
the oircumsltance3 under which it can be inferred by the 
jury. 
Respondent submits 'ijhat appellant's critique of the 
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com~t's rulings on his requested 1in&tructions, as well as 
his dispute with the instructions finally given by the court, 
raises no legal issues of any significance. 
CONCLUSION 
It is resectfully submitted that Officer Warren's ap-
pearance in court cannot be held ito be cause for reversal 
in light of Utah's well developed case 1law on the subjecJt. 
His appearance was probative on the issues of 1intent and 
degree of the crime, and was far less inflammaoory than 
pictures taken art the scene of the crime could have been. 
The jury's verdict, rendered on the basis of substantial evi-
dence and correct instruction, should 'be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Chief Assistant Aittorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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